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This article examines the extent to which, if any, the development of Europol’s external relations over 
time has contributed to the integration of EU policing and criminal justice. More precisely, with 
reference to the academic debates on ‘intergovernmentalism’ and ‘supranationalism’, it examines the 
extent to and the ways in which the growth in Europol’s external relations has indicated a move away 
from intergovernmentalism towards more supranationalism in the EU’s policing and criminal justice 
cooperation. It does so by systematically examining the development of Europol’s external relations 
over time using a continuum ranging from ‘intergovernmentalism’ to ‘supranationalism’ as ideal-types, 
whilst arguing for not reducing supranationalism to the ‘Community method’. The article shows that 
the balance between intergovernmental and supranational features in the governance of Europol’s 
external relations has changed over time as the latter have been gradually reinforced. Starting from a 
position close to the intergovernmental pole of the continuum, Europol has moved significantly towards 




Since it began its work in 1999, Europol, which is now a European Union agency that supports 
law enforcement cooperation, has developed a range of partnerships with third bodies and third 
countries, as varied as the International Criminal Police Organisation (Interpol), Brazil, China 
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and the United States.1 This growth in its international role has taken place against the backdrop 
of an expansion of its activities in general, as well as changes to its legal framework.2 It is 
important to emphasise that Europol is not an executive police force; it does not undertake 
searches or arrest suspects.3 From its inception, the core of its mandate has been to support the 
exchange of information amongst EU Member States.4 This has mainly taken place through 
the work of the liaison officers that represent each of the Member States at Europol’s 
headquarters in The Hague, as well as that of the Europol National Units in the Member States, 
which constitute the interface between Europol and the national authorities. These activities 
have been supported by the development of increasingly sophisticated and secure databases 
and information exchange systems.5 Given Europol’s focus on information exchange, it is 
perhaps unsurprising that developing relations with third countries and third bodies, which 
would notably enable information transfers, has been seen as a priority since its establishment.6 
 
This article contributes to this special issue by analysing the extent to which, if any, the 
development of Europol’s external relations over time has contributed to the integration of EU 
policing and criminal justice. More precisely, with reference to the academic debates on 
 
1 A list of Europol’s partners and agreements can be found on its website: www.europol.europa.eu/partners-
agreements (last accessed on 15 January 2021). 
2 J.D. Occhipinti, The Politics of EU Police Cooperation: Towards a European FBI? (Lynne Rienner, 2003); F. 
Coman-Kund European Union Agencies as Global Actors: A Legal Study of the European Aviation Safety Agency, 
Frontex and Europol (Routledge, 2018); S. Gless, ‘Europol’, in V. Mitsilegas, M. Bergström and T. Konstadinides 
(eds.), Research Handbook on EU Criminal Law (Edward Elgar, 2016), p. 457-479. 
3 J.D. Occhipinti, The Politics of EU Police Cooperation: Towards a European FBI? (Lynne Rienner, 2003); M. 
Deflem, ‘Europol and the Policing of International Terrorism: Counter-terrorism in a Global Perspective’, 23(3) 
Justice Quarterly (2006), 336-359.   
4 Article K.1(9) of the Treaty on European Union. 
5 Mounier, G., ‘Europol: A New Player in the EU External Policy Field?’, 10(4) Perspectives on European Politics 
and Society (2009), p. 584-585; F. Coman-Kund, European Union Agencies as Global Actors, p. 218; C. Kaunert, 
‘Europol and EU Counterterrorism: International Security Actorness in the External Dimension’, 33(7) Studies in 
Conflict & Terrorism (2010), p. 655. 
6 At the time of the signing of the Europol Convention, the Council made a declaration concerning Article 42, 
which highlighted that ‘Europol should as a matter of priority establish relations with the competent bodies of 
those states with which the European Communities and their Member States [had] established a structural 
dialogue’ (Council Act of 3 November 1998 laying down rules governing Europol’s external relations with third 
States and non-European Union related bodies (1999/C26/04), Citations). 
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‘intergovernmentalism’ and ‘supranationalism’, it examines the extent to and the ways in which 
the growth in Europol’s external relations has been indicative of a move away from 
intergovernmentalism towards more supranationalism in the EU’s policing and criminal justice 
cooperation. In so doing, this article also contributes to the scholarship on Europol in general 
and to the stream of scholarship that has examined the international role of Europol in 
particular. Although the issue of Europol’s external relations has received growing attention in 
the last few years, the specific question at the heart of this article – namely, whether the 
developing activities of Europol on the international stage are also indicative of an 
intensification of European integration - has not been addressed yet. Existing scholarship on 
Europol’s international role has focused on other questions, such as the issue of the legal status 
of Europol as an international actor or the challenges inherent to the development of its external 
activities.7 
 
In this article, it is argued that the evolution of the international role of Europol can be best 
understood by placing it on a continuum ranging from ‘intergovernmentalism’ to 
‘supranationalism’ as ideal-types. This emphasises that there is no dichotomy between 
intergovernmentalism and supranationalism as ideal-types. Rather, decision-making and 
policy-making in a specific policy area at a given time can exhibit both intergovernmental and 
supranational features. Concomitantly, the balance between supranational elements and 
intergovernmental elements can change over time and this can be highlighted by a systematic, 
chronological analysis. 
 
7 F. Coman-Kund, European Union Agencies as Global Actors: A Legal Study of the European Aviation Safety 
Agency, Frontex and Europol (Routledge, 2018), 210-254; C. Brière, ‘Cooperation of Europol and Eurojust with 
External Partners in the Fight against Crime: A Legal Appraisal’, in H.C.H. Hoffmann, E. Vos and M. Chamon 
(eds.), The External Dimension of EU Agencies and Bodies: Law and Policy (Edward Elgar, 2019); J.D. 
Occhipinti, The Politics of EU Police Cooperation: Towards a European FBI? (Lynne Rienner, 2003); M. 
Deflem, ‘Europol and the Policing of International Terrorism: Counter-terrorism in a Global Perspective’, 23(3) 




As a consequence, this article is structured as follows. It starts with the identification of a 
suitable analytical framework for analysing the evolution of Europol’s external relations. This 
section argues that using a continuum ranging from intergovernmentalism to supranationalism 
as ideal-types is the most adequate framework for exploring how the international role of 
Europol has evolved over time and whether there has been a move towards more 
supranationalism in that dimension of EU policing and criminal justice cooperation. The 
remainder of this article applies this analytical framework to empirical developments as it 
examines the evolution of the international role of Europol. More precisely, it considers how 
Europol’s external relations have been governed on the basis of its three successive legal bases, 
namely the Europol Convention, the Europol Council Decision and the Europol Regulation, 
with a particular emphasis on the balance between intergovernmental and supranational 
features. 
 
2. Understanding the evolution of Europol’s external relations: analytical framework 
Various analytical frameworks have been developed over the years to analyse and evaluate 
European integration. Many of those have compared and contrasted the different modes of 
policy-shaping and policy-making that have characterised different areas of EU cooperation.8 
Given that this special issue aims to explore the nature and depth of integration in the EU’s 
policing and criminal justice cooperation and more precisely whether there has been a move 
towards a more supranational and integrated framework, we argue that the most adequate 
framework for examining these questions in the case of Europol’s external relations is based 
on an understanding of European integration as involving a continuum ranging from 
 
8 A. Wiener, T. Börzel and T. Risse, European Integration Theory (Oxford University Press, 2019); B. Rosamond, 
Theories of European Integration (Palgrave Macmillan, 2000); M. Eilstrup-Sangiovanni, Debates on European 
Integration: A Reader (Palgrave Macmillan, 2006); M. Cini and N. Pérez-Solórzano Borragán (eds), European 
Union Politics (6th edition, Oxford University Press, 2019). 
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‘intergovernmentalism’ to ‘supranationalism’ as ideal-types, as originally suggested by Stone 
Sweet and Sandholtz.9  
 
This relates to one of the most important debates in the study of European integration, which 
has contrasted intergovernmentalism with supranationalism. According to 
intergovernmentalism, the key players in driving cooperation amongst states are the national 
executives. Thus, in the case of European integration, those are the national executives of the 
Member States. More precisely, ‘the distribution of preferences and the conduct of bargaining 
among the governments of the [Member States] broadly explain the nature, pace, and scope of 
integration, and neither supranational [organisations] nor transnational actors generate political 
processes or outcomes of seminal importance’.10 One of the most influential variants of 
intergovernmentalism has been the so-called ‘liberal intergovernmentalism’ originally 
developed by Moravcsik.11 It conceives of the development of European cooperation as a two-
level game. Policy preferences emerge domestically, before becoming the negotiating positions 
of the Member States, which bargain at the EU level. The relative powers of the Member States 
is a critical factor for the outcome of the negotiations, whereas the EU (and its predecessors) 
only provide a structure for this inter-state bargaining.12  
 
In contrast, supranationalism refers to a form of governance ‘in which [centralised] 
governmental structures (those [organisations] constituted at the supranational level) possess 
jurisdiction over specific policy domains within the territory comprised by the [Member 
 
9 A. Stone Sweet and W. Sandholtz, ‘European Integration and Supranational Governance’, 4 Journal of European 
Public Policy (1997), p. 302-303. 
10 A. Stone Sweet and W. Sandholtz, 4 Journal of European Public Policy (1997), p. 298 
11 A. Moravcsik, ‘Preferences and Power in the European Community: A Liberal Intergovernmentalist Approach’, 




States]’.13 As a result, these supranational structures are able to exercise a certain degree of 
constraint – which may be variable – over the behaviour of the political actors concerned, 
including the Member States. According to Dehousse and Weiler, the most distinctive features 
of supranationalism are ‘the existence of organs autonomous from the Member States in their 
composition and their functioning’ and ‘the resort in, intergovernmental bodies, to decision-
making processes which go beyond traditional diplomacy, such as the possibility of a vote and 
the giving up of “one state, one vote” principle’.14 Rather unhelpfully, in the academic 
literature, supranationalism has often been equated and interchangeably used with the so-called 
‘Community method’. Also known as ‘the ‘classic Community method’, it refers to the legal 
and institutional arrangements that traditionally characterised the so-called ‘Community pillar’, 
namely the adoption of ‘more or less uniform rules through binding legislative and executive 
acts at the EU level based on the Commission's exclusive right of legislative initiative, the 
legislative powers of the Council and the European Parliament, and the central role of the Court 
in guaranteeing the respect of the rule of law’.15 This article argues that the confusion between 
supranationalism and the ‘Community method’ is problematic for at least two reasons. The 
first is that it is conflating a concept with an empirical application. In other words, the 
‘Community method’ is an application of the idea of ‘supranationalism’. The second source of 
confusion is that the ‘Community method’ is only one possible empirical manifestation of the 
concept of ‘supranationalism’. In other words, whilst the ‘Community method’ is one of the 
ways in which supranationalism can be applied in practice, it is actually not the only one. One 
could observe the application of the idea of supranationalism outside the ‘Community method’. 
 
13 A. Stone Sweet and W. Sandholtz, ‘European Integration and Supranational Governance’, 4 Journal of 
European Public Policy (1997), p.303. 
14 R. Dehousse and J.H.H. Weiler, ‘The Legal Dimension’, in W. Wallace (ed.), The Dynamics of European 
Integration (Pinter, 1990), p. 250. 
15 S. Smismans, ‘From Harmonization to Co-ordination? EU Law in the Lisbon Governance Architecture’, 18(4) 
Journal of European Public Policy (2011), p. 505. See also R. Dehousse (ed.) The 'Community Method': Obstinate 
or Obsolete? (Palgrave Macmillan, 2011); H. Wallace and C. Reh, ‘An Institutional Anatomy and Five Policy 
Modes’, in H. Wallace, M.A. Pollack and A.R. Young (eds.) Policy-making in the European Union (Seventh 
Edition, Oxford University Press), p. 99-102.  
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This is particularly evident when one considers that, although supranationalism has often been 
associated with the EU, it is a concept that could potentially be used in other parts of the world 
beyond Europe. After all, one of the early uses of ‘supranational’ can be found in an article 
written by Albert Einstein calling for ‘supranational control’ over the use of atomic bombs in 
1947.16 As a consequence, and with a view to applying an ‘intergovernmentalism-
supranationalism’ continuum in the empirical analysis, this article calls for carefully 
distinguishing between ‘supranationalism’ and the ‘Community method’. Going back to the 
etymology of ‘supranationalism’ (i.e. above or beyond the borders of one nation), it is based 
on an understanding of supranationalism as referring to intensified cooperation amongst states 
above the national level, which may take the form of the ‘Community method’, but may take 
many other forms as well.  
 
Before proceeding further, it is important to acknowledge that some scholars may disagree with 
the choice of the analytical framework used in this article. One can identify some criticisms 
that some might level at the analytical framework adopted here. First of all, some scholars such 
as Wallace and Wallace have described the ‘intergovernmental-supranational continuum’ as 
an ‘overly simplistic dichotomy’.17 As a result, other analytical frameworks have been 
developed for analysing EU integration.18 One of those has been ‘intensive 
transgovernmentalism’, which has been coined in order to address the observation that 
‘[throughout] the history of the EU there have been examples of policy cooperation which have 
depended mainly on interaction between the relevant national policy-makers, and with 
 
16 A. Einstein, ‘Atomic War or Peace’ , 180(5) The Atlantic (1947), p. 29-32. 
17 H. Wallace and W. Wallace, ‘Overview: The European Union, Politics and Policy-making’, in K.E. Jørgensen, 
M.A. Pollack and B. Rosamond (eds.), Handbook of European Union Politics (Sage, 2006), p. 341. 
18 A. Wiener, T. Börzel and T. Risse, European Integration Theory (Oxford University Press, 2019); B. 
Rosamond, Theories of European Integration (Palgrave Macmillan, 2000); M. Eilstrup-Sangiovanni, Debates on 
European Integration: A Reader (Palgrave Macmillan, 2006); M. Cini and N. Pérez-Solórzano Borragán (eds), 
European Union Politics (6th edition, Oxford University Press, 2019); H. Wallace and C. Reh, ‘An Institutional 
Anatomy and Five Policy Modes’, in H. Wallace, M.A. Pollack and A.R. Young (eds.) Policy-making in the 
European Union (Seventh Edition, Oxford University Press), p. 72-112. 
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relatively little of the classical treaty-based involvement of the EU institutions’.19 This policy 
mode has also often been perceived as being characteristic of sensitive policy areas touching 
upon state sovereignty, such as the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (AFSJ).20 Thus, 
proponents of ‘intensive transgovernmentalism’ might argue that this theoretical lens would be 
more adequate for analysing the evolution of Europol’s external relations, given that Europol’s 
activities fall under the category of sensitive policy matters related to state sovereignty. It 
appears that this approach may have been particularly well-suited to examining the beginnings 
of European internal security cooperation, which were characterised by a dominant role for the 
Member States and a more marginal role for the EU institutions. However, given that one of 
its core ideas is the lack of involvement of the EU institutions in the development of a policy 
area, it is arguably not the most adequate framework for capturing the legal and institutional 
changes that could potentially reinforce the supranational character of a policy area. 
 
Another theoretical lens that might be presented as being particularly well-suited to studying 
the evolution of Europol is a specific variant of intergovernmentalism, which has been 
developed under the label of ‘new intergovernmentalism’ in recent years. Its proponents have 
argued that, since the signing of the Treaty of Maastricht in 1992, there has been a ‘tendency 
towards European integration without supranationalism’, which has been ‘predicated on an 
increasingly deliberative and consensual approach to EU decision-making’.21 At first sight, this 
approach appears to offer a promising theoretical lens through which one can examine the 
 
19 H. Wallace and W. Wallace, ‘Overview: The European Union, Politics and Policy-making’, p. 351. 
20 Ibid. See also S. Lavenex, ‘Transgovernmentalism in the Area of Freedom, Security, and Justice’, in I. Tömmel 
and A. Verdun (eds.) Innovative Governance in the European Union: The Politics of Multilevel Policymaking 
(Lynne Rienner, 2009), p. 255-271; S. Lavenex, ‘Justice and Home Affairs: Communitarization With Hesitation’, 
in H. Wallace, M.A. Pollack and A.R. Young (eds.), Policy-making in the European Union (Oxford University 
Press, 2010), p. 457-480. 
21 C.J. Bickerton, D. Hodson and U. Puetter (eds.), The New Intergovernmentalism: State and Supranational 
Actors in the Post-Maastricht Era (Oxford University Press, 2015), p. 1. 
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development of Europol’s external activities.22 This is because, still according to Bickerton, 
Hodson and Puetter, this further integration without supranationalism has notably taken place 
through the establishment and further development of so-called ‘de novo bodies’.23 Those are 
defined as ‘newly created institutions that often enjoy considerable autonomy by way of 
executive or legislative power and have a degree of control over their own resources’.24 In 
addition, they are said to ‘fulfil functions that could have been delegated to the Commission 
and tend to contain mechanisms for Member State representation as a part of their governance 
structure’.25 This category is broad as it includes bodies as different as the European Central 
Bank, the European External Action Service (EEAS), as well as ‘numerous regulatory and 
executive agencies’.26 Thus, according to that perspective, Europol would be one of these ‘de 
novo bodies’ and the increase in its activities, including the development of its international 
role, would confirm the new intergovernmentalist thesis that further European integration is 
taking place without supranationalism. There are some problems with new 
intergovernmentalism. It is beyond the scope of this article to examine all of them.27  It suffices 
here to point out two problems in particular, which make new intergovernmentalism 
inappropriate for examining the evolution of Europol’s external relations. The first is the 
problematic character of the definition of ‘de novo bodies’. One of the central features of ‘de 
novo bodies’ for Bickerton and his colleagues is that they are given ‘functions that could have 
been delegated to the Commission’, which, still in their view, would constitute evidence that 
European integration is now taking place without supranationalism. However, that assumption 
 
22 S. Wolff, ‘Integrating in Justice and Home Affairs: A Case of New Intergovernmentalism Par Excellence?’, in 
C.J. Bickerton, D. Hodson and U. Puetter (eds.), The New Intergovernmentalism: State and Supranational Actors 
in the Post-Maastricht Era (Oxford University Press, 2015), p. 129. 
23 C.J. Bickerton, D. Hodson and U. Puetter, ‘The New Intergovernmentalism: European Integration in the Post-




27 See F. Schimmelfennig, ‘What’s the News in “New Intergovernmentalism”? A Critique of Bickerton, Hodson 
and Puetter’, 53(4) Journal of Common Market Studies (2015), p. 723-730.  
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is simply not true in the case of an agency like Europol, as one cannot conceive how the 
European Commission could have fulfilled the specialised tasks that this agency has been 
delegated. The second problem is that, in practice, ‘de novo bodies’ actually ‘display a wide 
variation of intergovernmental and supranational features’28, which means that the creation of 
‘de novo bodies’ cannot necessarily be equated with a rise in intergovernmentalism and a 
retreat of supranationalism, as suggested by Bickerton, Hodson and Puetter. Therefore, 
although intensive transgovernmentalism or new intergovernmentalism might be able to shed 
some light on developments in the AFSJ, including the evolution of Europol, they are not well-
equipped to capture possible shifts between intergovernmental and supranational features in a 
policy area.   
 
As a consequence, having considered possible alternative frameworks, this article argues that 
the most adequate framework for examining the evolution of Europol’s external relations and 
whether it points towards a strengthening of European integration is a continuum ranging from 
intergovernmental to supranational as ideal-types. In order to address the aforementioned 
objections, it is important to point out that a conceptualisation in terms of a continuum precisely 
aims to avoid the limitations of a clear-cut dichotomy between intergovernmentalism and 
supranationalism. Being able to locate a policy development at one point on a spectrum 
precisely enables an analyst to highlight that it combines both supranational and 
intergovernmental elements and to assess the balance between those.29 In addition, the use of 
an analytical framework based on a continuum allows for an assessment of the evolution of 
this balance between supranational features and intergovernmental features over time. Finally, 
it is important to emphasise that using a continuum does not pre-suppose that cooperation in a 
 
28 Ibid., p. 724. 
29 See also R. Dehousse and J.H.H. Weiler, ‘The Legal Dimension’, p. 251. 
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given policy sector necessarily moves from the ‘intergovernmental’ to the ‘supranational’ pole 
of the continuum. It can highlight how cooperation in a given policy area may remain the same 
in terms of the balance between intergovernmental and supranational features over time or 
could even move in one direction at one point and then in the opposite direction later. 
 
3. The evolution of Europol’s external relations: towards more supranationalism? 
Before proceeding to analyse the evolution of Europol’s external relations, it is necessary to 
briefly present the wider context in which those have developed. For that purpose, the next 
section outlines the strategic framework that the EU has strived to develop over time for the 
external dimension of the AFSJ, which notably comprises the external relations of Europol. 
 
3.1 The external dimension of the AFSJ 
Although the main objective of the AFSJ is internal, it has been acknowledged from the 
beginning that its successful completion entailed the development of external action. The 
Presidency Conclusions of the Tampere European Council in October 1999 already called for 
the definition of ‘clear priorities, policy objectives and measures for the Union’s external action 
in Justice and Home Affairs’ (as the AFSJ was known then).30 Since then, a significant number 
of strategy and programming documents have been adopted, which are important for the ways 
in which they have framed the external relations of an agency active in the AFSJ like Europol. 
According to Monar, one can identify four categories of such documents.31 The first are 
documents laying down a strategy for the development of the AFSJ in its entirety, such as the 
so-called ‘Tampere Programme’ and ‘The Hague Programme’, which contain sections 
concerning external relations, including in the field of policing and criminal justice 
 
30 Tampere European Council, Presidency Conclusions, 15-16 October 1999. 
31 J. Monar, ‘The EU’s Growing External Role in the AFSJ Domain: Factors, Framework and Forms of Action’, 
27(1) Cambridge Review of International Affairs (2014), p. 159-160. 
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cooperation.32 The second category contains strategic documents for the development of the 
external dimension of the AFSJ, such as the influential ‘Strategy for the external dimension of 
the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice’, which was adopted in December 2005.33 The third 
category gathers documents aiming to lay down a strategy for the development of specific sub-
fields of the AFSJ, which usually also address their external dimension. An example is the 
EU’s Counter-terrorism Strategy, which was adopted in 2005.34 The fourth category of 
programming and strategic documents identified by Monar are documents focusing on specific 
third countries or regions, such as the ‘Strategic and concerted action to improve cooperation 
in combating organised crime, especially drug trafficking, originating in West Africa’ Council 
document adopted in 201035 and the various Action Plans adopted in the framework of the 
European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP).36 Thus, it is remarkable to see how much energy has 
been devoted to trying to lay down a strategy and a programme for the development of the 
external dimension of the AFSJ and its various components. However, it is important to 
highlight two limitations to the EU’s endeavours. First of all, as suggested by the paragraphs 
above, the external dimension of the AFSJ has been characterised by a high degree of 
complexity in terms of its strategic development. This has been mirrored at the institutional 
level with the involvement of a large number of policy actors.37 Moreover, it is noteworthy that 
Member States have remained ‘free to conclude individual agreements on external aspects of 
 
32 Tampere European Council, Presidency Conclusions, 15-16 October 1999; ‘The Hague Programme: 
Strengthening Freedom, Security and Justice in the European Union’, 2005/C 53. 
33 Council of the European Union, ‘A Strategy for the External Dimension of JHA: Global Freedom, Security and 
Justice’, 15446/05, 6 December 2005. 
34 Council of the European Union, ‘The European Union Counter-terrorism Strategy’, 14469/4/05, 30 November 
2005. 
35 Council of the European Union, ‘Implementing the strategy for the external dimension of Justice and Home 
Affairs Action-oriented paper: Strategic and concerted action to improve cooperation in combating organised 
crime, especially drug trafficking, originating in West Africa’, 5069/3/10, 25 March 2010. 
36 See C. Kaunert and S. Leonard, ‘EU Counterterrorism and the European Neighbourhood Policy: An Appraisal 
of the Southern Dimension’, 23(2) Terrorism and Political Violence (2011), p. 286-309. 
37 F. Coman-Kund, European Union Agencies as Global Actors, p. 216. 
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internal security – a freedom they [have made] ample use of’38, although they have been 
required to abide by the principles of ‘loyalty and mutual solidarity cooperation’.39  
 
3.2 Europol’s external relations under the Europol Convention 
Europol was established by a Council Act in 1995 – known as the Europol Convention40 - and 
became operational on 1 July 1999.41 The Treaty of Maastricht, which had entered into force 
in 1993, had established two new ‘pillars’, alongside the European Community, namely the 
‘Common Foreign and Security Policy’ and ‘Justice and Home Affairs’ (later known as the 
‘Area of Freedom, Security and Justice’ (AFSJ)).42 With regard to the latter, the Treaty on 
European Union laid down that, ‘[for] the purposes of achieving the objectives of the Union, 
in particular the free movement of persons, […] Member States [should] regard the following 
areas as matters of common interest: […] police cooperation for the purposes of preventing 
and combating terrorism, unlawful drug trafficking and other serious forms of international 
crime, including if necessary certain aspects of customs cooperation, in connection with the 
organization of a Union-wide system for exchanging information within a European Police 
Office (Europol)’.43 From an institutional point of view, the Treaty on European Union largely 
maintained the predominantly intergovernmental character of the cooperation on policing and 
criminal justice matters, which had informally - and largely secretly - developed in ad hoc 
bodies, such as the Trevi group, in the previous two decades.44 The institutional arrangements 
 
38 J. Monar, ‘The EU's Externalisation of Internal Security Objectives: Perspectives after Lisbon and Stockholm’, 
45(2) The International Spectator (2010), p. 33. 
39 Article 23(3) TEU. See J. Monar, ‘The Integration of Police and Judicial Cooperation in Criminal Matters into 
EU External Relations: Achievements and Problems’, in C. Fijnaut and J. Ouwerkerk (eds.) The Future of Police 
and Judicial Cooperation in the European Union (Brill, 2009), p. 71-72. 
40 Council Act of 26 July 1995 drawing up the Convention based on Article K.3 of the Treaty on European Union, 
on the establishment of a European Police Office (Europol Convention) [1995] OJ C 316/1. 
41 Council of the European Union, ‘Europol Annual Report 1999’, Doc. 7728/2/00 , 11 May 2000. 
42 Title V and Title VI of the Treaty on European Union. 
43 Article K.1 of the Treaty on European Union. 
44 C. Kaunert and S. Leonard, ‘The Collective Securitisation of Terrorism in the European Union’, 42(2) West 
European Politics (2019), p. 264-265; A. De Moor and G. Vermeulen, ‘The Europol Council Decision: A New 
Legal Basis for Europol’, 1(2) New Journal of European Criminal Law (2010), p. 180-181. 
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that it formalised kept the Member States as the dominant actors – now taking decisions within 
the Council of Ministers - , whilst giving very limited competences to the European 
Commission, the European Parliament and the Court of Justice. The Treaty on European Union 
also enabled the Council to ‘draw up conventions which it shall recommend to the Member 
States for adoption in accordance with their respective constitutional requirements’.45 As a 
result, the Europol Convention was adopted by the Council on 26 July 1995. It can therefore 
be described as an intergovernmental agreement that the Member States concluded within the 
framework of the EU and that each of them had to ratify according to its own constitutional 
requirements. Consequently, at the time, Europol was a fully-fledged international 
organisation. It possessed full legal personality, which meant that it was allowed to enter into 
binding agreements under international law.46 
 
Article 42 of the Europol Convention stipulated that Europol was allowed to ‘establish and 
maintain relations with third states and third bodies’ as necessary for the performance of its 
tasks.47 This provision referred to Article 10, which envisaged that, if the performance of its 
tasks justified it, Europol was allowed to accept and to request information from various third 
parties, including third states, international organisations and the International Criminal Police 
Organisation (Interpol).48 The Convention did not stipulate the rules governing Europol’s 
external relations. Rather, it tasked the Council with drawing up the rules for governing 
Europol’s external relations. Those were to be adopted by the Council acting unanimously 
according to the procedure laid down in Title VI of the Treaty on European Union, after having 
 
45 Article K.3(2) of the Treaty on European Union. 
46 D. Heimans, ‘The External Relations of Europol: Practical, Legal and Operational Considerations’, in B. 
Martenczuk and S. van Thiel (eds.) Justice, Liberty and Security: New Challenges for EU External Relations 
(VUB Press, 2008), p. 369; C. Kaunert, ‘Europol and EU Counterterrorism’, p. 659. 
47 Article 42(2) of the Europol Convention. 
48 Article 10(4) of the Europol Convention. 
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obtained the opinion of the Management Board.49 In practice, this meant that the role of the 
supranational institutions was severely limited. At the time, the European Commission had not 
been granted any right of initiative in the fields of criminal justice cooperation and police 
cooperation.50 As for the European Parliament, it only had the rights to be informed and to be 
consulted about JHA developments51. 
 
At the time of the signing of the Europol Convention, the Council made a declaration 
concerning Article 42, which highlighted that ‘Europol should as a matter of priority establish 
relations with the competent bodies of those states with which the European Communities and 
their Member States [had] established a structural dialogue’.52 As a result, in November 1998, 
the Council adopted rules governing the external relations of Europol with third states and third 
bodies.53 Those identified several steps in the negotiation of an agreement between Europol 
and a third state or third body. First, the Council was expected to draw up a list of third states 
and third bodies with which Europol was to negotiate an agreement. Second, the Director of 
Europol was required to consult the Management Board and to receive the authorisation by the 
Council to start the negotiations, such an authorisation being potentially conditional. Third, the 
Council was required to give its unanimous approval for an agreement to be concluded.54 
Europol was able to conclude two types of agreements, namely ‘strategic cooperation 
agreements’ and ‘technical cooperation agreements’.55 Whereas the former were limited to the 
 
49 Article 42(2) of the Europol Convention. Article 28 of the Europol Convention stipulated that the Management 
Board comprised one representative of each Member State, as well as a representative of the European 
Commission, albeit with non-voting status.  
50 Article K.3(2) of the Treaty on European Union. 
51 Article K.6 of the Treaty on European Union. 
52 Council Act of 3 November 1998 laying down rules governing Europol’s external relations with third States 
and non-European Union related bodies (1999/C26/04), Citations. 
53 Council Act of 3 November 1998 laying down rules governing Europol’s external relations with third States 
and non-European Union related bodies (1999/C26/04). 
54 Council Act of 3 November 1998 laying down rules governing Europol’s external relations with third States 
and non-European Union related bodies (1999/C26/04), Article 2(3). 
55 Europol, 1998-2016: Looking Back, Moving Forward – One Hundred Meetings of the Europol Management 
Board (Publications Office of the European Union, 2016), p. 93. 
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exchange of strategic and technical information only, the latter also allowed for the exchange 
of personal data.56 As highlighted by Mounier, from the viewpoint of practitioners (i.e. police 
officers), ‘only operational agreements [had] a real added value for investigations because 
strategic agreement merely [allowed] the exchange of threat assessments and analytical 
reports’.57 The key issue that determined the type of agreement negotiated was whether it was 
considered that the security and data protection standards applied by the potential partner were 
adequate. This decision was taken by the Council.58  
 
In March 2000, the Council authorised the Director of Europol to begin negotiations on 
agreements with a series of third states and third (i.e. non-EU related) bodies. In the context of 
the debates on and the preparations for the EU’s enlargement, there was a significant emphasis 
on developing Europol’s cooperation with states holding the membership candidate status, as 
evidenced by the inclusion of Bulgaria, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia and Turkey on the list. Other third 
states were also included, namely Bolivia, Canada, Colombia, Morocco, Norway, Peru, the 
Russian Federation, Switzerland and the United States, as well as third bodies, such as ICPO-
Interpol, the United Nations Drugs Control Programme and the World Customs Organisation.59 
By the end of 2004, ten strategic and seven operational agreements had been signed and ratified 
and had entered into force.60 The 2000 Council Decision indicated that these third states and 
third bodies had been selected on the basis of ‘operational requirements and the need to combat 
in an effective way organised forms of criminality through Europol’.61 However, and although 
 
56 Ibid., p. 94. 
57 G. Mounier, ‘Europol: A New Player in the EU External Policy Field?’, p. 587. 
58 Ibid. 
59 Council Decision of 27 March 2000 authorising the Director of Europol to enter into negotiations on agreements 
with third States and non-EU-related bodies, 2000/C 106/01, Article 2. 
60 Europol, 1998-2016: Looking Back, Moving Forward, p. 94. 
61 Council Decision 2000/C 106/01, Recital (2). 
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Europol was at the time a separate international organisation with its own legal personality, it 
is clear that some broader political considerations were sometimes at play, as evidenced by the 
focus on the states that were about to join the EU in the 2000 Council Decision as previously 
mentioned. Another example was the initiative of the European Commission in 2004 to state, 
in a Communication on ‘An EU-India Strategic Partnership’, that ‘the Council could reflect on 
including India in its list of “priority countries” for a “strategic cooperation agreement” with 
Europol’ without seemingly having consulted Europol.62 Nevertheless, the prime example of 
the influence of broader foreign policy considerations on Europol’s external relations was 
arguably provided by the swift signing of an agreement with the US in the aftermath of 9/11 
despite strong reservations about the low data protection standards.63 Thus, although Europol 
enjoyed its own legal personality and was not an EU agency at that point, there were already 
attempts by supranational institutions, such as the European Commission, at influencing its 
activities and shaping them according to wider strategic considerations. However, the Council 
appeared to be keen on defending its prominent position in the area. This was aptly shown by 
the adoption of four legislative instruments concerning Europol by the Council on 30 
November 2009.64 The date is important because it was the eve of the entry into force of the 
Treaty of Lisbon or, in other words, the last day on which the European Parliament merely had 
the right to be consulted (and thereby potentially ignored). The European Parliament had asked 
for the four proposals to be withdrawn and then re-tabled on the basis of the new provisions 
contained in the Treaty of Lisbon. As those were granting the European Parliament decision-
 
62 G. Mounier (2009) ‘Europol: A New Player in the EU External Policy Field?’, p. 588. 
63 Ibid., p. 587-588; E. Ilbiz, C. Kaunert and D. Anagnostakis, ‘The Counterterrorism Agreements of Europol with 
Third Countries: Data Protection and Power Asymmetry’, 29(6) Terrorism and Political Violence (2017), p. 972-
974. 
64 Council Decision 2009/934/JHA of 30 November 2009 adopting the implementing rules governing Europol’s 
relations with partners, including the exchange of personal data and classified information; Council Decision 
2009/935/JHA of 30 November 2009 determining the list of third States and organisations with which Europol 
shall conclude agreements; Council Decision 2009/936/JHA of 30 November 2009 adopting the implementing 
rules for Europol analysis work files; Council Decision 2009/968/JHA of 30 November 2009 adopting the rules 
on the confidentiality of Europol information. 
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taking powers on these matters, there would have been more democratic scrutiny according to 
the European Parliament.65 However, this request was eventually turned down by the Council, 
which confirms that the European Parliament’s control of Europol was very limited under the 
Europol Council Decision. 
 
Thus, referring back to the intergovernmental-supranational continuum, the above analysis 
showed that, under the Europol Convention, Europol was located close to the 
intergovernmental pole of the continuum. Even then, there were some supranational elements 
in its governance, some of which were informal. However, those were very limited, most 
notably because they had been largely opposed by the Member States at the time. 
 
3.3 Europol’s external relations under the Europol Council Decision 
The legal framework for Europol changed as a result of the adoption of Council Decision 
2009/371/JHA (Europol Council Decision) in April 2009.66 One of the main reasons for its 
adoption was to bring Europol in line with the legal framework of the other bodies operating 
in the AFSJ. Indeed, the activities of Eurojust – Europol’s judicial counterpart - and the 
European Police College (Cepol) were both based on a Council Decision.67  
 
As it was adopted before the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon on 1 December 2009, the 
Europol Council Decision was based on the provisions of the Treaty of Amsterdam, which had 
already been in force for ten years. This treaty had had an important impact on the third pillar, 
as it had transferred a series of matters (namely, asylum, migration, border controls and 
 
65 ‘Europol reforms: MEPs criticize Council and demand democratic scrutiny’, Press release, European 
Parliament, Reference No.: 20091123IPR65046. 
66 Council Decision of 6 April 2009 establishing the European Police Office (Europol) (2009/371/JHA). 
67 A. De Moor and G. Vermeulen, ‘The Europol Council Decision: Transforming Europol into an Agency of the 
European Union’, 47 Common Market Law Review (2010), p. 1094. 
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cooperation in civil justice cooperation) to the first pillar, whilst leaving policing and 
cooperation in criminal justice matters in the third pillar. In addition, the Treaty of Amsterdam 
had provided more detailed provisions regarding the contents of police cooperation, including 
‘the collection, storage, processing, analysis and exchange of relevant information, including 
information held by law enforcement services on reports on suspicious financial transactions, 
in particular through Europol, subject to appropriate provisions on the protection of personal 
data’.68 It had also tasked the Council with ‘[promoting] cooperation through Europol’ and had 
set a series of specific objectives relating to Europol to be accomplished within a period of five 
years following the entry into force of the Treaty.69 The Treaty of Amsterdam also strengthened 
the position of the supranational institutions in policing and criminal justice to some extent. 
The European Parliament’s right to be informed and consulted was enhanced70, whilst the 
European Commission received a right of initiative in this field71, alongside a reinforced 
position for the Court of Justice.72 
 
The adoption of the Europol Council Decision was an important development as it transformed 
Europol from an international organisation into an EU agency. Although it kept its legal 
personality, its new status as an EU agency led to the introduction of new forms of control over 
its activities. First of all, parliamentary control increased.73 This was because, from 1 January 
2010, Europol was funded by the EU’s general budget and no longer through the contributions 
from Member States.74 As a result, the role of the European Parliament was enhanced given its 
direct involvement in the adoption of the budget.75 Moreover, in terms of broader political 
 
68 Article 30(1) of the Treaty on European Union. 
69 Article 30(2) of the Treaty on European Union. 
70 Article 39 of the Treaty on European Union. 
71 Article 34 of the Treaty on European Union. 
72 Article 35 of the Treaty on European Union.  
73 M. Busuioc, ‘Accountability, Control and Independence: The Case of European Agencies’, 15(5) European 
Law Journal (2009), p. 599-615. 
74 Article 42 of the Europol Council Decision and Article 35 of the Europol Convention. 
75 A. De Moor and G. Vermeulen, ‘The Europol Council Decision’, p. 1117. 
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control, the European Parliament gained the right to request the Presidency, the Chairman of 
the Management Board and the Director to appear before it. This was a strengthening of its 
position compared to its position under the Europol Convention, when it had enjoyed the right 
to be consulted, but had been largely ignored in practice.76 
 
With regard to Europol’s external relations, the new Europol Council Decision did not 
introduce any significant change. The European Commission had been in favour of ensuring a 
stronger alignment of Europol’s external relations with the EU’s strategy for the development 
of its external relations in general. However, both Europol and the Member States were not in 
favour of such a change.77 As a result, Article 23 of the Europol Council Decision continued 
to allow Europol to develop cooperative relations with third states and international 
organisations if necessary for performing its tasks.78 It also indicated that cooperation 
agreements should be concluded for underpinning these cooperative relations.79 Article 23 of 
the European Council Decision also laid down that, in line with Europol’s focus on the 
exchange of information, the agreements concluded by Europol with third states and 
international organisations were to centre on the transmission of information.80 With regard to 
the important issue of the procedures to follow for the conclusion of these agreements, the 
Europol Council Decision indicated that approval by the Council was required prior to the 
conclusion of any agreement. This approval could only be granted after the Council had 
consulted the Management Board, as well as obtaining the opinion of the Joint Supervisory 
Body81 via the Management Board in the case of the exchange of personal data.82 By way of 
 
76 A. De Moor and G. Vermeulen, ‘The Europol Council Decision’, p. 1117. 
77 A. De Moor and G. Vermeulen, ‘The Europol Council Decision’, p. 1107-1108. 
78 Article 23(1) of the European Council Decision. 
79 Article 23(2) of the European Council Decision. 
80 Article 23(2)-(9) of the European Council Decision. 
81 The Joint Supervisory Body was an independent body in charge of Europol’s data protection control. It was 
composed of representatives of national supervisory bodies (see Article 24 of the European Council Decision). 
82 Article 23(2) of the Europol Council Decision.  
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derogation, Europol was also allowed to transmit personal data and classified information 
without an operational agreement being in place in very specific circumstances.83 Although 
this provision was to be applied only under extraordinary conditions, it was important because 
it did not involve the Management Board (and thereby the Member States). Moreover, although 
the European Commission had not been formally granted a role in the negotiation of the 
agreements, in practice, there were regular meetings and informal communication between the 
Commission and Europol, ‘enabling the Commission to ask Europol to put more or less 
emphasis on one file or another according to the priorities in the EU external action area’.84 
 
Thus, going back to the intergovernmental-supranational continuum, one can argue that the 
adoption of the Europol Council Decision led to a move towards more supranationalism in 
Europol’s external relations. This resulted from a strengthening of the role of the supranational 
institutions in both the design of Europol’s legal instrument – as a result of the entry into force 
of the Treaty of Amsterdam – and the day-to-day activities of Europol, including those relating 
to its external relations. However, this move towards the supranational pole was rather modest 
overall and the Member States remained dominant. 
 
3.4 Europol’s external relations under the Europol Regulation  
The legal basis of Europol significantly changed as a result of the adoption of the Europol 
Regulation, which began to apply on 1 May 2017.85 The most important development that 
influenced the content of this new Europol legal instrument was the entry into force of the 
 
83 Article 23(8) and (9) of the Europol Council Decision. 
84 F. Coman-Kund, European Union Agencies as Global Actors, p. 229. 
85  Europol Regulation (EU) 2016/794 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 May 2016 on the 
European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation (Europol) and replacing and repealing Council 
Decisions 2009/371/JHA, 2009/934/JHA, 2009/935/JHA, 2009/936/JHA and 2009/968/JHA [2016] OJ L 135/53 
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Treaty of Lisbon on 1 December 2009. The development of the ‘Common Approach on EU 
Agencies’ also played a role.86 
 
The Treaty of Lisbon was signed by the EU Member States in December 2007 and entered into 
force on 1 December 2009. It was important for the development of Europol’s international 
role for two main reasons. First, it modified the legal provisions governing policy-making on 
policing and criminal justice cooperation. Secondly, it introduced a single legal personality for 
the EU, which put an end to the conduct of different external policies under different regimes 
(i.e. EC and EU).87 Concerning the former, the Treaty of Lisbon introduced significant 
innovations in the AFSJ. It formally abolished the three-pillar structure that had been created 
by the Treaty of Maastricht. As a result, new legislative measures concerning policing or 
criminal justice cooperation would now take the form of Directives or Regulations.88 Those 
would be adopted through the ordinary legislative procedure – with the Council and the 
European Parliament as co-legislators on an equal footing – and would fall under the normal 
jurisdiction of the Court of Justice.89 However, Protocol 36 on transitional provisions laid down 
various derogations. Those are worth mentioning here because they are often used as evidence 
of the persistence of intergovernmentalism in the AFSJ.90 For a period lasting five years after 
the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon (i.e. until 1 December 2014), the competences of 
the Court of Justice and of the European Commission remained unchanged. Thus, the European 
Commission did not have the power to begin infringement proceedings against the Member 
States that were not meeting their obligations with regard to policing and criminal justice 
 
86 ‘Joint Statement of the European Parliament, the Council of the EU and the European Commission on 
decentralised agencies’, 2012. 
87 Article 47 TEU. 
88 Articles 87 and 88 TFEU. 
89 S. Peers ‘Mission Accomplished? EU Justice and Home Affairs Law after the Treaty of Lisbon’ (2011) 48 
Common Market Law Review, p. 692-693 
90 S. Wolff, ‘Integrating in Justice and Home Affairs: A Case of New Intergovernmentalism Par Excellence?’ in 
C. J. Bickerton, D. Hodson, and U. Puetter (eds.), The New Intergovernmentalism: States and Supranational 
Actors in the Post-Maastricht Era (Oxford University Press, 2015), p. 132-133. 
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cooperation during the five-year transition period. Nor did the Court of Justice have full 
jurisdiction over these matters, unless a Member State had chosen to accept this jurisdiction. 
According to a report authored for the European Parliament, by November 2014, 18 Member 
States had formally accepted the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice, which had been handing 
down rulings.91 Whilst these transition measures can indeed be seen as evidence of the 
persistence of intergovernmentalism in police and criminal justice cooperation, it is important 
to emphasise that they duly came to an end as planned. This led to a strengthening of the 
supranational features in this policy area, as the role of the supranational institutions was 
reinforced. 
  
Moreover, as previously mentioned, the Treaty of Lisbon introduced some significant changes 
with regard to the EU’s external relations, as it introduced a single legal personality for the EU 
as a consequence of the abolition of the three-pillar structure. In addition, it laid down that 
‘[the] Union [should] ensure consistency between the different areas of its external action and 
between these and its other policies’ and tasked the Council and the Commission to ensure that 
consistency.92 Thus, this duty of consistency notably applied to the external dimension of the 
AFSJ. As a result, it was now expected that there would be coherence between the external 
activities of the EU and those of European agencies, such as Europol. This expectation was 
reinforced as a result of the development of the so-called ‘Common Approach on EU 
agencies’.93 This foresaw the strengthening of the relations between the European Commission 
and all EU agencies, including Europol, in order to enhance consistency across the EU’s 
activities. In addition, some concerns regarding the lack of parliamentary scrutiny over 
 
91 European Parliament (2014) ‘The End of the Transitional Period for Police and Criminal Justice Measures 
Adopted Before the Lisbon Treaty: Who Monitors Trust in the European Justice Area?’, Study for the LIBE 
Committee, Brussels: European Parliament, p. 13. 
92 Article 21(3) of the Treaty on European Union. 
93 ‘Joint Statement of the European Parliament, the Council of the EU and the European Commission on 
decentralised agencies’, 2012. 
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Europol’s external relations had been expressed. In particular, the European Commission had 
highlighted how the coherence of the EU’s external role could be affected, if Europol’s external 
relations agenda were not brought in line with that of the EU.94 As for the European Parliament, 
it had previously expressed its dismay about its lack of involvement in both the design and the 
control of Europol’s activities, including its external relations, as previously mentioned. The 
development of Europol’s cooperation with the US authorities in the aftermath of the terrorist 
attacks on 11 September 2001 had been a particularly sensitive issue.95 For that reason, the 
European Parliament was very intent on making use of Article 88 TFEU in order to increase 
its say on the design, operation and control of Europol’s activities, including its international 
cooperation.96  
 
Having considered the background to the adoption of the Europol Regulation, it is now possible 
to examine the significant changes that it introduced to Europol’s external relations. First of 
all, Europol lost the competence to sign new cooperation agreements from 1 May 2017, 
although the agreements concluded until then would be preserved.97 From that date onwards, 
international agreements entailing the transfer of personal data would have to be concluded 
according to Article 218 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU.98 Furthermore, the 
Management Board is now only allowed to suggest to the Council to draw the attention of the 
European Commission to the need for concluding such an international agreement.99 In other 
words, the role of Europol in initiating the negotiations towards an agreement allowing for the 
exchange of personal data has been significantly curtailed, whilst the position of the Council 
 
94 A. De Moor and G. Vermeulen, ‘The Europol Council Decision’, p. 1107-1108. 
95 G. Mounier (2009) ‘Europol: A New Player in the EU External Policy Field?’, p. 587-588; E. Ilbiz, C. Kaunert 
and D. Anagnostakis, ‘The Counterterrorism Agreements of Europol with Third Countries’, p. 972-974. 
96 See notably ‘Europol reforms: MEPs criticize Council and demand democratic scrutiny’, Press release, 
European Parliament, Reference No.: 20091123IPR65046. 
97 Article 25(4) of the Europol Regulation. 
98 Article 25(1) and (4) of the Europol Regulation. 
99 Article 11(2) of the Europol Regulation. 
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and that of the European Commission have been strengthened in that respect. Moreover, the 
application of Article 218 TFEU has meant that the Council has been granted the competence 
to take decisions on the opening of the negotiations, the adoption of the negotiation directives, 
as well as the authorisation of the signing and of the conclusion of the agreement. As for the 
European Parliament, its position has also been reinforced as it has to give its consent to the 
agreements allowing for the exchange of personal data.100 For Europol, this has been a major 
change compared to its role under the Europol Council Decision, when it was leading the 
initiation, the negotiation and the conclusion of the cooperation agreements.101 However, it has 
been given the competence to conclude working arrangements and administrative 
arrangements. Working arrangements do not allow for the exchange of personal data and are 
explicitly non-binding, whereas the administrative arrangements aim to enable personal data 
exchanges.102 
 
Another change introduced by the Europol Regulation has been the further enhancement of the 
role of the European Commission with regard to Europol’s external relations. This has been 
evidenced by its power to adopt ‘adequacy decisions’ prior to personal data exchanges103, as 
well as its competence to give its opinion on Europol’s multiannual programming and annual 
work programmes.104 Furthermore, the Joint Supervisory Board has been replaced by the 
European Data Protection Supervisor, who has been given considerably stronger powers, 
including those of banning Europol’s processing operations or referring a matter to the Court 
of Justice.105 Finally, the Europol Regulation has maintained the derogations enabling the 
 
100 Article 88(2) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and Article 218(6)(a) of the Treaty on 
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Executive Director to take its own decision on the exchange of personal data in specific 
circumstances.106 
 
Thus, with reference to the intergovernmental-supranational continuum, one can argue that the 
application of the Europol Regulation has led to a further move towards more supranationalism 
in Europol’s external relations. Again, this has resulted from a strengthening of the role of the 
supranational institutions in both the design of Europol’s legal basis – as a result of the entry 
into force of the Treaty of Lisbon – and the day-to-day activities of Europol, including those 
relating to its external relations. Compared to the previous move that followed the adoption of 
the Europol Council Decision, this was a more significant move towards the supranational pole 
of the continuum given the considerable strengthening of the positions of the European 




This article set out to examine the extent to which, if any, the development of Europol’s 
external relations over time has contributed to the integration of EU policing and criminal 
justice. More precisely, with reference to the academic debates on ‘intergovernmentalism’ and 
‘supranationalism’, it has examined the extent to and the ways in which the growth in Europol’s 
external relations has been indicative of a move away from intergovernmentalism towards 
more supranationalism in the EU’s policing and criminal justice cooperation. After considering 
several possible analytical frameworks, it has justified the selection of a continuum ranging 
from intergovernmental to supranational as the most adequate for addressing the question at 
the heart of this article. The importance of carefully distinguishing supranationalism from the 
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‘Community method’ has also been emphasised. The application of this intergovernmental-
supranational continuum to the evolution of Europol’s external relations, with reference to its 
three consecutive legal bases, has shown that Europol – with regard to its activities in the 
external domain - has gradually and significantly moved towards the supranational pole of the 
intergovernmental-supranational continuum. Originally, it was located closely to the 
intergovernmental pole of the continuum, as the governance of its external relations had only 
very limited and generally informal supranational features. Both the Europol Council Decision 
and the Europol Regulation have led to moves towards the supranational pole of the continuum, 
as the role of supranational institutions has been reinforced with regard to both the design of 
Europol and its day-to-day activities. In other words, the supranational character of Europol’s 
governance in its external relations has been considerably strengthened over time. One can 
therefore argue that Europol’s external relations have contributed to further integration in 
police and criminal justice cooperation in the EU. 
 
 
